When the Private Sector Enters Cyber Operations: Where Does Defense End?

The Trigger

The White House published a presidential memorandum directing the creation of a new program to combat transnational cyber-enabled criminal organizations. The program would allow vetted U.S. companies to participate in cyber operations against foreign cybercrime groups.

This is not permission for any company to retaliate after an attack. The memorandum describes a program under federal control, involving the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. Each operation must be reviewed and approved in writing before action is taken.

The issue matters because it raises a new question for cybersecurity: what happens when the private sector participates not only in defense and investigation, but also in operations that may observe, disrupt or stop infrastructure used by foreign cybercrime groups.

What the Program Actually Allows

According to the memorandum, only participating companies accepted into the program and working under contract with the federal government may take part. They must meet criteria for technical competence, personnel vetting, facility security, reliability and proven ability to conduct such operations.

Operations must target foreign cyber-enabled transnational criminal organizations, not arbitrary targets. The program also requires coordination with federal agencies, the intelligence community and other government bodies.

There are explicit restrictions. Operations cannot be approved if they are likely to result in death, serious injury or rise to the level of use of force or armed attack under international law.

The Question That Remains

Even with these restrictions, the topic remains sensitive. In cyberspace, targets are rarely isolated. Criminal groups use third-party infrastructure, cloud services, compromised servers, legitimate platforms and systems located across different jurisdictions.

This creates a difficult operational question: how do you prove that a target is truly a cybercrime group, and not mixed infrastructure, an affected third party or a group with links to state interests?

This is where the boundary becomes complex. An action may be intended as investigation or disruption, but another party may interpret it as interference, attack or escalation.

Why “Hack Back” Is Not a Standard Defensive Measure

In classic defense, an organization strengthens its own environment: it monitors, investigates, restricts access, restores systems and notifies affected parties.

Counter-offensive action follows a different logic. The action moves outside the organization’s own environment. That changes the legal, technical and diplomatic risk.

If an operation affects the wrong system, infrastructure in an allied country or data belonging to a third party, the consequences are not only technical. They may include legal liability, international dispute, retaliation or loss of trust in the program itself.

What This Means for Companies

For most organizations, this memorandum does not mean they should consider independent retaliation. It instead shows how complex the boundary between public and private cyber activity is becoming.

Companies need to clearly separate:

• defending their own infrastructure;
• collecting threat intelligence;
• investigating an incident;
• assisting government authorities;
• taking active action outside their own environment.

The last category is entirely different. It requires legal authority, evidence, oversight, technical controls and clear accountability.

DIAMATIX Comment

From the DIAMATIX perspective, this topic matters not because every organization will participate in such programs, but because it shows how cybersecurity is moving toward a more complex model of responsibility.

Defense cannot be based on impulse, assumption or retaliation. Even when the target is a criminal group, actions must be evidence-based, bounded and controlled. Otherwise the risk shifts from technical to legal, reputational and geopolitical.

For most organizations, the correct focus remains clear: strong visibility, reliable logs, access control, response readiness, coordination with competent authorities and accurate incident communication.

Questions for CISOs and Leadership Teams

• Where is the boundary between active investigation and action outside authorized scope?
• Do we have an internal policy that prohibits independent “hack back” activity?
• What do we do if we discover infrastructure being used against us?
• Who decides when government authorities should be involved?
• How do we preserve evidence without altering external systems?
• How do we separate technical hypothesis from proven attribution?
• How do we communicate an incident without naming an actor before verification?

The practical takeaway: in cybersecurity, strong response does not always mean counterattack. Often it means better evidence, faster coordination and more precise risk containment.

Strengthen defense before considering counter-offense

DIAMATIX helps regulated organizations build visibility, logs, response readiness and coordination processes for cyber incidents.

Request a cyber incident response readiness review with DIAMATIX.
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Sources

• The White House. Expanding Capabilities to Combat Transnational Cyber-Enabled Crime.
• Reuters. Trump signed memo to allow use of cyber tools to target transnational criminal organizations.
• Cybersecurity Dive. US government will let private companies hack criminal gangs.
• Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law. To Hack Back or Not Hack Back.

Sources and publicly available information are current as of August 2026. Analytical sections are marked as DIAMATIX comment and do not imply that the program permits independent retaliation by private companies.